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Abstract
The next-generation technological era will be marked
by the prevalence of highly automated decision-making
systems (ADMS), which promote technological
autonomy at the expense of human agency. In this paper,
we examine the role and importance of socio-ethical
factors in the responsible adoption of ADMS by
organizations. In doing so, we draw on the unique
characteristics of ADMS and leverage the literature on
social responsibility to conceptualize what a
responsible adoption process and a responsible
adoption decision involve. The resulting framework
makes a much-needed connection between technology
adoption and social responsibility and offers a
progressive foundation to study ADMS adoption.

1. Introduction
A number of pundits have started to observe a role
reversal whereby humans are becoming used and shaped
by technologies. For example, Demetis and Lee [1]
claim that “human agency is becoming subordinate to
automatic executions…” (p. 930) and that “technology
is overtaking not only human decisions and the context
of their embeddedness, but also entire subsystems of
society” (p. 932). We refer to this development as the
rise of highly automated decision-making systems
(ADMS). ADMS have several benefits that make their
adoption by organizations attractive. They are
consistent, efficient, scalable, and can manage a much
greater level of complexity than humans can. Yet, they
are fallible and can yield (intentionally or not) harmful
consequences such as privacy violations, unwarranted
surveillance,
uninformed
control,
or
unfair
discrimination [2], [3]. They can also have second-hand
effects, often detrimental, on those subject to their use
by others. In sum, ADMS have become quite
controversial especially given that the activities and
contexts to which they are increasingly being applied
involve socially sensitive situations that have high
ethical content; for example, social ranking [4], crime
prediction [5], [6], and bail, parole, and criminal
sentencing [7].
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Our goal in this paper is to develop a theoretical
framework that emphasizes the socio-ethical factors
surrounding the decision made by organizations to
deploy an ADMS. This endeavour, which echoes
contemporary callings like critical technological
citizenship [8] and critical digital capitalism [9], as well
as early writings on the diffusion of new technology
e.g., [10], [11]–[13], is intended to move researchers’
attention beyond the rather instrumentalist perspective
espoused by existing information technology (IT)
adoption theories [14], [15]. This literature focuses on
the questions of why, when, and how prospective
organizations and individuals adopt or intend to adopt
an IT for their own use and benefits, without inquiring
whether the adoption decision or the process leading to
the decision is socially responsible [16], [17].
In developing the framework, we specify a new set
of constructs to capture the gist of the phenomenon and
we introduce the theoretical logic underlying their
relationships. We follow a deductive approach whereby
we develop a conceptualization of ADMS that considers
their unique characteristics and we combine it with
contextualized insights from social responsibility
theory. The resulting theoretical framework aims to
make a three-fold contribution: clarifying our
understanding of what the responsible adoption of
ADMS by organizations entails, offering a platform for
future research on the topic, and opening the door to a
paradigm change in the study of IT adoption that is
likely to yield important new insights into how
organisations engage with the decision to deploy (or to
restrain from deploying) increasingly autonomous and
value-laden technologies. In the remainder of this paper,
we specify the theoretical boundaries of our inquiry, we
present the theoretical framework, and we discuss the
research’s contributions and its limitations.

2. Theoretical Boundaries
2.1. What is an ADMS?
We define ADMS as software products or softwareenabled objects that bring a significant level of
automation into decision making processes.

Page 4900

Importantly, very high levels of automation pave the
way to technological autonomy, a situation where
“humans find themselves outside, i.e., cast out to the
environment, outside of these decisions, and (…) human
agency—acting on behalf of another, or providing a
particular service—is being replaced by technologized
agency” [1], p. 933. As an example of the link between
automation and autonomy, think of motor vehicles. The
US Department of Transportation defines six stages of
automation ranging from level 0 (no automation, i.e., the
driver performs all the driving task) to level 5 (full
automation, i.e., the vehicle is autonomous, driverless),
with intermediary stages where the driver and the
automated-driving system share control and
responsibilities.
ADMS are different from decision-support systems
(DSS). A DSS is an interactive system aimed at helping
people (e.g., managers, consumers) make decisions
(often characterized as ill-structured problems) [18]. In
turn, an expert systems is a computer program (often
based on artificial intelligence techniques) that aims to
mimic experts at making complex, non-algorithmic
decisions [19][20]. The goal of an expert systems can
thus include automation, making it similar to an ADMS;
yet as we will explain, the scope of automation in an
ADMS can go much further than that of an expert
system. Because the notions of decision-making and
automation are complex and central to our
conceptualization of ADMS, illustrated in Figure 1, we
describe them in more details in the rest of this section.

Keys:
(1) Prediction needs data, and so do judgment and
actions;
(2) A decision-making agent (human or machine) takes
actions relying on both prediction and judgment;
(3) Actions lead to outcome (consequences)
(4) Outcomes generate data that can be used as an input
to other/future decisions;
A: Prediction is automated, and so could judgment and
action

Figure 1. Conceptual Representation of an
ADMS (based on [21])
Decision making plays an equally critical role in
everyday life [21] and in organizations [22]. Figure 1

highlights a fundamental assumption in our work:
decision making requires applying judgment to
predictions and then acting [21], all of which may be
conducted by either a human and/or a machine.
Prediction is an important input to decision-making “the
process of filling in missing information… (taking)
information you have, often called data, and (using) it
to generate information you don’t have,” ([21], p. 24).
Note that some decision-making situations can be
formalized, thus automated, fairly easily. These do not
rely on prediction and data, but on a set of preestablished rules accounting for known contingencies.
Yet, in many complex real-life situations, it is virtually
impossible to specify and formalize all the rules that
would be necessary to faithfully capture a situation (e.g.,
hiring a new CEO, driving a vehicle in an urban area).
Such situations require prediction, thus data. In sum,
automated prediction is at the core of ADMS
Note that a predictive engine designed into an
ADMS may also derive its own rules from data itself
(i.e., by “learning”)¾this is the domain of machine
learning (ML), a technology at the core of AI
applications. AI is an umbrella term that is commonly
used to refer to data-driven algorithms that enable
computing engines to learn how to perform tasks which
would be virtually impossible to automate based on
formal rules (e.g., object identification, language
processing). Similar to Demetis and Lee ([1], p. 944),
we consider such applications as representative
examples of extreme cases of sophisticated ADMS,
where predictive models can recalibrate themselves
automatically based on data. These applications require
different data sets: a training data set is used to create
the predictive model, an input data set enables running
it, and a feedback data set serves as a basis to improve
the model.
In the healthcare context an ADMS could automate
prediction (e.g., estimate the most likely outcomes of
applying treatments A or B based on X-rays, blood tests,
and monitoring data) so as to inform a doctor who could
then apply his or her judgment (e.g., considering other
criteria such as patients’ age, lifestyle, and sensitivity to
potential risks and side effects) and enact the decision
(e.g., administer treatment A). But as Figure 1 also
stresses, prediction is not the only component of an
ADMS that might be automated. As with motor
vehicles, the trend is toward more extensive automation,
thus full technological autonomy [1], which happens
when a machine undertakes an entire task, not just the
prediction component of it. For example, a fully
autonomous vehicle automates prediction (e.g.,
anticipating vehicles’ trajectory), judgment (e.g.,
evaluating whether the vehicle should hit what would
appear to be a pedestrian or risk killing the driver), and
action (e.g., braking or changing direction).
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2.2 From Adoption to Responsible Adoption
What does adoption refer to in the context of the
present research? Information Technology (IT)
adoption (or acceptance) research offers a large variety
of models explaining how, why, and when individuals
or collectives decide to adopt a new technology. Some
studies have focused on users’ adoption decision e.g.,
[23] while others have examined on organizations’
decisions e.g., [24]. Altogether, this research suggests
that adoption is an information-intensive process
wherein potential adopters consider a set of relevant
factors (e.g., about the context into which they situate,
the innovation per se, its consequences) so as to inform
a decision about the commitment (of resources) to
deploy a new IT. We follow this overall view of
adoption, and we proceed by further asking what
responsible adoption involves from the perspective of
an organization.
In its contemporary usage in a business context, the
concept of social responsibility (SR) is often associated
with that of corporate social responsibility (CSR), and
its application to different business functions such as
marketing [26], [27], finance [28], and logistics [29].
The content covered by CSR has varied over the years.
For example, in Carroll’s [30] view, CSR touches upon
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropical aspects,
while the European Commission [31] only points to
social and environmental concerns and the triple
bottom-line proponents consider economic, social, and
environmental targets [25], [32]. Despite divergences in
content, all views concur on the fact that CSR aims to
promote the accountability of profit-seeking business
entities in a market environment. Hence, SR is closely
linked to CSR, but it applies more widely outside of a
corporate context and in both individual and group
capacities. Because ADMS adoption decisions are not
restricted to private corporations, SR appears to be a
more suitable lens to inform a working definition of
responsible adoption. In its most generic portrayal, SR
implies caring for societal values and for needs and
effects that go beyond narrowly defined indicators and
self-centered points of reference. On that basis, we
define responsible adoption in terms of both the
decision-making process and the decision that take into
consideration the socio-ethical implications of putting
an ADMS into use.
A couple of points in this definition need to be
highlighted. First, similar to Van der Duin [33] in the
context of responsible innovation, we choose a broad
perspective that enables examining responsible
adoption both as a means (the process) and as an end
(the decision). Second, while the process and the
decisions are our two focal units of analysis, some
entity, at the end, makes a decision and is responsible

for it. In our context, the entity or entities involved in
the adoption decision can be viewed as those having
moral agency. That is, any collective making a moral
decision, where the later refers to a volitional decision
that has a moral component given its possible harm on
or benefit to others [34].

3. Framework Development
3.1. Responsible Adoption Decision (RAD)
We start by specifying three constructs to capture
the extent of responsibility of an ADMS adoption
decision. Altogether, these constructs imply that a RAD
(i) takes into account the moral implications of the
technology on the community concerned by it (civicmindedness), (ii) is sensible to its impacts in the long
haul (foresightedness), and (iii) is accessible and
understandable by the community (transparency).
First, social responsibility theory emphasizes the
idea that decision-makers have moral obligations.
Indeed, the primary concern of SR involves the
consideration of a socio-ethical dimension when acting
and making decisions; in other words, it requires caring
for others who might be impacted by one’s actions and
decisions [34]. This is especially relevant in the
technological context in general [35]–[37] and in the
ADMS context in particular, as the range of applications
that ADMS enable cover highly socially-sensitive
domains. For example, hiring, evaluating, monitoring,
censoring, arresting, and judging people are all
susceptible to being governed by ADMS, and this
triggers complex risks such as the potential for
systematic, large-scale discrimination [38] and for
geopolitical instability [39]. Balancing the benefits and
risks when it comes to making decisions and innovating
is not a trivial endeavor, and for ADMS it might require
weighting conflicting moral values such as security and
privacy, or freedom and control [3] and considering a
larger set of ethical principles [40], all of which cannot
be done unobservant to situational value standards¾we
will discuss this further in section 3.2. Thus, we define
as first dimension of RAD, civic-mindedness, as the
degree to which the adoption decision adheres to the
values and moral expectations of the community that is
relevant in the considered context.
Second, the more recent applications of SR to the
technological innovation context emphasize the need to
be prepared and care for the future, that is, make
decisions that are sensitive to time and forward-looking.
Technological changes are inherently uncertain, and
their social consequences are powerful but also hard to
predict beforehand [41], [42]. However, the difficulty to
examine an uncertain future, with its multiple causal
chains and dependencies, does not preclude from taking
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decisions that are mindful of it [33], [43]. On the other
hand, it may stress “our ability to act responsibly in the
present on behalf of future generations” [44], p. 1880.
ADMS adoption decisions that are responsible should
be particularly sensitive to this need for anticipation
because they have substantial societal ramifications that
make adopters morally accountable to others now but
also in the future [16], [17]. Thus, we define as second
dimension of RAP, foresightedness, as the degree to
which the adoption decision is sensible to the long-run
implications of using the ADMS on the community that
is relevant in the considered context.
A third important notion that links social
responsibility to ADMS adoption is transparency [45]–
[47]. In general terms, transparency can be viewed as a
“right to know”, which is a principle that individuals
have the right to know about the decisions (and possible
ensuing risks) to which they may be subject [48]. In a
technology context, transparency has two key
components, accessibility and comprehensibility [49],
and has sometimes been translated into regulation. For
example, the new European General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) mentions that “the data subject
shall have the right to [know about] the existence of
automated decision-making.” Accessibility and
comprehensibility are particularly salient characteristics
in the context of ADMS adoption because ADMS tend
to be concealed and have indirect, second-hand effects.
Thus, the socio-ethical quandaries that they produce
may not be easily resolved, but at minimum, they could
be open to scrutiny. As reminded by Florini ([48],
p.viii), it is sometimes the case that “sunshine is the
strongest antiseptic.” Thus, we define as third dimension
of RAP, transparency, as the degree to which the
adoption decision is inspectable and understandable by
the community that is relevant in the considered context.

3.2. Responsible Adoption Process (RAP)
Because ADMS are quite unique, a responsible
adoption process will need to account for their
idiosyncratic characteristics. Given the absence of
theory on ADMS, we specify RAP by two means. First,
we draw on explicit premises about the differentiating
characteristics of ADMS (i.e., they are opaque, valueladen, and can have side and systemic effects) to
identify four constructs that capture the responsibility of
an adoption process in the context of ADMS. Second,
we specify (for each four constructs) how they would
manifest with respect to each conceptual building block
of an ADMS (data, prediction, judgment, and action –
see Figure 1)
A starting premise is that the functioning of an
ADMS can be quite opaque [50][46][45][50]–[52].
Burrel [50] explains that software code can generate

three types of opacity. One (intentional secrecy) results
from a decision to keep software code proprietary (e.g.,
the google search engine algorithm). Another (technical
illiteracy) is a consequence of the specialized skills
required to write (and read) code and of the fact that
such skills are not widespread among the population. A
third type (interpretability) is more specific to ADMS as
it is a consequence of the complexification of
algorithmic, often data-driven, systems and the resulting
difficulty of “understanding the algorithms in action,
operating on data” (p. 5). Despite some progress e.g.,
[53], [54], explaining the decisions generated by highlysophisticated ADMS remains difficult, an issue
sometimes known as the interpretability problem [55].
ADMS can be quite complex and more or less
autonomous based on whether and how prediction,
judgment, and action are automatized. To be able to
evaluate the possibilities and risks associated with
adopting an ADMS, a clear understanding of its
functioning mechanisms and assumptions is needed.
Thus, we define a first dimension of RAP, functional
scrutiny, as the degree to which the adoption process
includes a thorough analysis of the key components and
operational logic of a focal ADMS. A more specific
coverage of functional scrutiny can be derived from the
key components of an ADMS (see Figure 1) and is
presented in Table 1.
Table 1. The Scope of Functional Scrutiny
DATA. Analyzing the data that is being used in the
prediction: its origin, its quality (e.g., accuracy,
reliability, completeness), and its role (e.g., training,
feedback, operation) in the ADMS.
PREDICTION. Analyzing what is being predicted by
the ADMS, what factors are used to derive the
prediction as well as their weight in the prediction, and
how accurate the result of the prediction is expected
to be.
JUDGMENT. Analyzing the potential outcomes (what
may happen as a result of a potential action), the value
that is assigned to each outcome, their prioritization,
and whether the ADMS automatizes judgment or
leaves it to humans’ responsibility.
ACTION. Analyzing the decision that is at stake, the
possible actions associated with this decision, and
whether the ADMS automatizes actions or leaves it to
humans’ responsibility.

A second premise is that ADMS embed moral
values [3], [49], [52], [56]–[58]. The idea that
information technologies are not value-neutral dates
back several decades e.g., [59] and is at the core of a
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number of fields of research such as value-sensitive
design [35], [60]–[62] and engineering and computer
ethics [37], [63], [64]. As Van den Hoven [17] puts it,
our social world is “shaped by the algorithms that
determine how far our messages reach into our
networks, what is recommended to us on the basis of
what the system has learned about our search history and
preferences, what is filtered out and how our reputation
is built.” (p. 66) Although all technological design
decisions may be viewed as morally loaded as they
represent (intentionally or not) the value system of
designers, the automatization and scalability of datadriven predictions make that statement much more
salient in the ADMS context. In essence, ADMS rate
and rank things, events, and also individuals [65], [66],
and this can be particularly problematic when
predictions are based on sensitive categorizations such
as race or gender [67]. For O’Neil [38], such algorithmic
intelligence is nothing else than “opinions embedded in
math” (p. 19). To be able to examine what is at stake
from a moral standpoint if an ADMS is to be deployed,
a clear understanding of the nature and magnitude of the
ethical challenges it involves is needed. Thus, we define
a second dimension of RAP, ethical reflexivity, as the
degree to which the adoption process involves the
careful deciphering of the moral values embedded in or
promoted by a focal ADMS. The key components of an
ADMS (see Figure 1) help further circumscribe the
scope of ethical reflexivity (Table 2).

prediction engine may not belong to a direct user, and
the outcomes may include effects on non-direct users, a
phenomenon that Leidner et al. [69] refer to as secondhand effects and that Doorn and Van de Poel [37]
characterize as indirect causation. The planned or
emergent consequences of ADMS can thus ripple out to
a wide range of individuals who may not be directly
using the technology. Therefore, in order to examine the
set of potential impacts of an ADMS, the individuals
who are involved, directly or indirectly, in its operation
need to be included in the evaluation process. In fact, the
value of an inclusive approach and the need for all
relevant agents to exert their influence in a technologyrelated decision-making process has long been known to
facilitate the achievement better results for the relevant
community as a whole [11]. Thus, we define a third
dimension of RAP, stakeholder inclusiveness, as the
degree to which the adoption process involves the
participation of a representative set of stakeholders
relevant to the particular context of application of a focal
ADMS. The key components of an ADMS (see Figure
1) can help specify the scope of stakeholder
inclusiveness (Table 3).

Table 2. The Scope of Ethical Reflexivity

PREDICTION. Participation of those for whom the
prediction is made or who are subject to its outcome,
as well as those who are involved in designing the
prediction engine

DATA. Inspecting the ADMS in function of ethical
considerations associated with the use of data (e.g.,
privacy, anonymity, security.)
PREDICTION. Inspecting the ADMS in function of
ethical considerations associated with operating the
predictive engine (e.g., transparency, fairness,
justice.)
JUDGMENT. Inspecting the ADMS in function of
ethical considerations associated with the making of
judgments (e.g., autonomy, accountability.)
ACTION. Inspecting the ADMS in function of ethical
considerations associated with the conduct of actions
(e.g., control, accountability.)

A third premise is that ADMS have indirect and
systemic effects [68]. By this we mean that a
(sometimes) large range of people may be involved in
operating the ADMS as well as be subject to its
consequences. For example, the data used in a

Table 3. The Scope of Stakeholder Inclusiveness
DATA. Participation of those whose data is used in the
ADMS and/or those who generate, collect, and own
the data.

JUDGMENT. Participation of those who make the
judgments or who are subject to its outcome, and if
relevant, those involved in designing the rules
underlying the automatized judgment.
ACTION. Participation of those who conduct the
actions or who are subject to its outcome, and if
relevant, those involved in designing the rules
underlying the automatized action.

The fourth construct we propose to capture RAP
also relates to the systemic nature of ADMS. To be able
to execute the socially responsible practice of making an
integrative assessment of the impacts of an ADMS on
stakeholders with potentially different interests and
concerns, prioritization and conflict resolution is likely
needed [3]. This requires a holistic effort in unifying
insights and points of view in light of the norms and
moral standards relevant to a specific societal context
into which the ADMS might be deployed. Technology
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engineers are often confronted with moral dilemmas in
their design work as they need to solve conflicting
(value) requirements [70]. In doing so, they need to
resolve difficult trade-offs (e.g., safety vs. efficiency,
security vs. privacy, control vs. freedom). As Newell
and Marabelli [3, p. 10] illustrate : “when algorithms
determine that particular categories of people (e.g.,
based on race, income, job) are more likely to commit a
crime and, as a result, those concerned find difficulty in
obtaining a loan or changing job … this clearly violates
basic privacy rights, but is justified based on the idea
that it will increase security in society.” Thus, we define
a fourth dimension, integrative evaluation, as the
degree to which the adoption process involves a
systemic evaluation of the consequences of deploying a
focal ADMS in light of the moral standards acceptable
in the considered context of application. Similar to the
previous three constructs, the key components of an
ADMS (see Figure 1) help specify the scope of
integrative evaluation (Table 4).
Table 4. The Scope of Integrative Evaluation
DATA. Evaluating the possible consequences of
deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas
associated with its use of data.
PREDICTION. Evaluating the possible consequences
of deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas
associated with the design and operation of its
predictive engine.
JUDGMENT. Evaluating the possible consequences
of deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas
associated with the judgment process.
ACTION. Evaluating the possible consequences of
deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas
associated with the actions resulting from combining
prediction and judgment.

3.3. Relationships between the Components of
RAP and RAD
In this section, we propose a set of causal
relationships that we suspect to exist between the
constructs developed to conceptualize RAP (links 1 to
6) and RAP (links 7 to 8), and those between RAP and
RAD (links 9 to 11). They are modeled in the research
framework illustrated in Figure 2.
RAP (links 1 to 6). Stakeholder inclusiveness,
functional scrutiny, ethical reflexivity, and integrative
evaluation define the degree of responsibility of an
ADMS’ adoption decision-making process. We start
with the ultimate outcome in a responsible adoption

process: integrative evaluation. The difficult integrative
assessments that need to be made during an adoption
assessment process, such as those involving the
comparison and prioritization of different alternatives,
are more effective when they are supported by quality
informational inputs [71]. Thus. we expect that
stakeholder inclusiveness, functional scrutiny, and
ethical reflexivity will improve integrative evaluation,
In line with this idea, we propose that integrative
evaluation will benefit from functional scrutiny (link 1)
because it will enable the consideration of more accurate
inputs about what a focal ADMS can afford and prevent.
Integrative evaluation will also benefit from ethical
reflexivity (link 2) because awareness and knowledge of
what is at stake from an ethical perspective with respect
to a focal ADMS will help generate more complete
inputs to assess its possible impacts and “what is right”
in a particular context. Stakeholder inclusiveness will
enable integrative evaluation (link 3) because including
a representative set of stakeholders in the decisionmaking process is likely to yield inputs that are more
nuanced, wide-ranging, and thus more reliable. Next, we
expect that functional scrutiny will enable ethical
reflexivity (link 4) by affording a more accurate
representation of the ADMS, which will help detect
ethical concerns. This could happen via different means
such as the provision of a conceptual map of the key
components and mechanisms that will facilitate the
ethical examination. For example, knowing that the
judgment component in an ADMS is automated and
knowing its rules and assumptions will help identify
ethical concerns that could be associated with it, such as
whether the judgment logic is reliable, fair and
transparent. Finally, we expect that stakeholder
inclusiveness will improve (i) functional scrutiny (link
5)¾because a more complete set of domain and
technical expertise should contribute to a more thorough
analysis of an ADMS’ structure and operational logic,
and (ii) ethical reflexivity (link 6)¾by providing a more
complete view of the ethical considerations relevant for
a focal ADMS.
RAD (links 7 and 8). Our conceptualization of
RAD indicates that civic-mindedness, foresightedness,
and transparency define an ADMS adoption decision’
degree of responsibility. We expect that both civicmindedness and foresightedness will enable
transparency because the opening and explaining of a
decision is easier and less risky when the content of a
decision is more sensitive to socio-ethical matters. Thus,
a civic-minded decision is likely to facilitate
transparency by making the decision more socially
legitimate, thus less risky to communicate (link 7). In a
similar vein, we expect that foresightedness will
encourage transparency because foresightedness
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involves anticipation and caution, two attributes that
also favor social legitimacy (link 8).
Responsible adoption decision

Responsible adoption process
(9)
improves (by
increasing
awareness and
understanding of
the decision’s
socio-ethical
implications)

Ethical reflexivity
(6)
enables (via a more
complete view of ethical
implications)

Stakeholder
inclusiveness

(4)
enables (via a
more accurate
understanding
of ethical
implications

(2)
enables (via more
complete inputs on the
scope and content of
ethical concerns)
(3)
enables (via
more nuanced,
wide-ranging,
and reliable
inputs)

(5)
enables (via a more
complete sets of
expertises)

Functional scrutiny

Integrative evaluation

(1)
enables (via more
accurate inputs on
technological
aﬀordances and
constraints )

Civic-mindedness
(7)
enables (via
more socially
legitimacy)

(11)
improves (by
increasing
confidence in
the decision)

(10)
improves (by
increasing
awareness and
understanding of
possible long-run
implications)

Transparency
(8)
enables (via
more socially
legitimacy)

Foresightedness

Figure 2. Research Framework
Relationships between RAP and RAD (links 8, 9,
and 10). Responsible decisions are not likely to just
happen; instead, they are likely to result from a
proactive responsible process [35]. Thus, we expect
RAP and RAD to be related. Integrative evaluation is a
particularly important component of RAP because it
involves building on the insights generated by both
technological and ethical assessments. As such, we
expect that it will be the key driver of RAD. The three
resulting relationships can be explained as follows.
First, we expect that integrative evaluation will improve
civic-mindedness because it will increase decisionmakers’ awareness and understanding of the socioethical implications of adopting a focal ADMS (link 9).
Second, we expect that integrative evaluation will
improve foresightedness because a thorough holistic
contextual assessment is likely to help better anticipate
longer-run implications of ADMS (link 10). Third, we
expect that integrative judgement will also improve
transparency because it will increase decision-makers’
confidence, thus their willingness to make the adoption
decision available for public scrutiny (link 11).

4. Discussion
The framework that we have introduced in this
paper makes some important contributions. First, it
introduces a new concept, responsible adoption, and it
clarifies what it involves in the context of automated
decision-making systems. ADMS constitute an
increasingly prevalent type of technology, which is
often deployed to automate socially sensitive processes.

The adoption of ADMS by public and private
organizations, thus their increased presence in society,
implies a growing dependence on automated systems in
the making of important decisions affecting people in
their everyday life (e.g., should parole be given to a
particular individual) and managerial decisions alike
(e.g., whom to hire or to promote; which product factory
to invest in or decommission). This calls for a certain
level of caution on behalf of the adopting entity. Thus, a
larger implication of our theoretical model is that future
research will need to change paradigm when examining
ADMS. The existing paradigm in the IT literature
espouses a view that is anchored in premises that are not
well-aligned with the reality of ADMS and ADMS
adoption. This paradigm is technophile, value-neutral,
and it focuses on the assessment of benefits and impacts
in the immediate surrounding of the decision-maker. In
contrast, we propose a broader, responsible-centric view
that considers the socio-ethical and systemic aspects that
are so inherently tied to the deployment of ADMS.
Because the present study has focused on laying out
the conceptual basis for the study of the responsible
adoption of ADMS, it offers substantial opportunities
for future research. One important direction to augment
the proposed theoretical framework is to account for
contextual factors., that is, investigate how the model
varies across ADMS adoption circumstances [72].
Researchers could start with examining factors that
hinder or facilitate the enabling effect of integrative
judgement on the components of responsible adoption
decisions. These are particularly interesting
contingencies to study because we have reasoned that a
responsible adoption process enables but does not
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guarantee responsible adoption decisions. In other
words, other factors and mechanisms might influence
the presence and strength of these links. Contextual
factors to consider include those capturing differences
in the socio-ethical implications that are at stake, such
as the extent of moral intensity [73], as well as those
about the domain of application of the ADMS (e.g., type
of industry), the decision-making setting (e.g.,
organizational ethical culture, organization size,
subjective norms), and the decision-makers (e.g.,
agency, decision style, education, cognitive moral
development, personal values) [74].
In a similar vein, future work could consider how
those factors and others¾such as technology/ADMS
self-efficacy [75] and stakeholder engagement and
participation in IT-related decisions [76]¾could make
stakeholder inclusiveness, functional scrutiny, and
ethical reflexivity more effective so as to better support
integrative judgement.
Another path consists in examining how different
types of ADMS influence responsible adoption. For
example, an ADMS in its preliminary stage of
development might be perceived as unstable or highly
risky and thus it might be evaluated differently (e.g.,
ethical reflexivity and functional scrutiny might be more
salient) than an ADMS that has been used and tested for
some time. Pursuing this line of research would require
developing a typology of ADMS and group the types
along key characteristics and features that are relevant
to RAP and RAD (e.g., degree of complexity/opacity of
the ADMS, type of dominant values associated with the
ADMS, scale of the system affected by the ADMS).
Another avenue consists in identifying important
triggers, drivers, and outcomes of RAP and RAD. In
relation to triggers and drivers, it is important to stress
that ADMS adoption decisions are rarely made in
vacuums and that a variety of factors may hinder the
process as well as the decision. This calls for studies
about how psychological, social and institutional factors
may influence responsible adoption including pressures
to engage in such initiatives. Researchers may account
for such pressures at different levels including
individual (e.g., employees), groups (e.g., advocating
groups), country (e.g., governments), and supranational
(e.g., intergovernmental organizations) [77].
Finally, while we have assumed responsible
adoption to be “good”, how good is it really and does
goodness vary depending on stakeholder perspectives?
In other words, what are the consequences of
responsible adoption? These questions call for further
investigation into the effects of RAP and RAD on
different stakeholders and the community in which they
operate. There is some evidence that corporate
social/environmental investment can have positive
effects on financial performance [78], but we do not

know whether similar or different kinds of benefits can
be achieved in the case of responsible ADMS adoption.

5. Conclusion
Highly automated decision-making systems differ
from most ITs studied in the past, making the traditional
adoption paradigm less suitable. In this paper, we have
leveraged the literature on social responsibility to
propose a new focus on responsible adoption,
conceptualized in terms of both a process and a decision
that take into consideration the socio-ethical
implications of putting an ADMS into use. The
proposed framework connects technology adoption and
social responsibility and offers a progressive foundation
to study ADMS adoption.

6. References
[1]

[2]
[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]
[7]

[8]
[9]

[10]
[11]

D. Demetis and A. Lee, “When Humans Using the IT
Artifact Becomes IT Using the Human Artifact,”
Journal of the Association for Information Systems,
vol. 19, no. 10, Oct. 2018,
V. Eubanks, Automating inequality: How high-tech
tools profile, police, and punish the poor. St. Martin’s
Press, 2018.
S. Newell and M. Marabelli, “Strategic opportunities
(and challenges) of algorithmic decision-making: A
call for action on the long-term societal effects of
‘datification,’” The Journal of Strategic Information
Systems, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 3–14, Mar. 2015.
A. Ma, “China has started ranking citizens with a
creepy ‘social credit’ system — here’s what you can
do wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways
they can punish you,” Business Insider, 2018.
D. Ensign, S. A. Friedler, S. Neville, C. Scheidegger,
and S. Venkatasubramanian, “Runaway Feedback
Loops in Predictive Policing,” arXiv:1706.09847 [cs,
stat], Jun. 2017, Accessed: Mar. 03, 2019. [Online].
A. G. Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing:
Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law
Enforcement. New York: NYU Press, 2017.
D. Kehl, P. Guo, and S. Kessler, “Algorithms in the
Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk
Assessments in Sentencing,” Responsive Communities
Initiative, Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society, Harvard Law School., 2017, Accessed: Feb.
21, 2019. [Online].
V. Eubanks, Digital Dead End. MIT Press, 2012.
M. Grimshaw, “Towards a manifesto for a critical
digital humanities: critiquing the extractive capitalism
of digital society,” Palgrave Communications, vol. 4,
no. 1, p. 21, Feb. 2018.
M. Bunge, “Towards a Technoethics,” The Monist,
vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 96–107, 1977.
E. Mumford, “The ETHICS approach,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 36, no. 6, p. 82,
Jan. 1993.

Page 4907

[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]
[16]
[17]

[18]

[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]
[27]

[28]

N. Wiener, Cybernetics: Control and Communication
in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1948.
L. Winner, The whale and the reactor: A search for
limits in an age of high technology. University of
Chicago Press, 1986.
A. Majchrzak, M. L. Markus, and J. Wareham,
“Designing for Digital Transformation: Lessons for
Information Systems Research from the Study of ICT
and Societal Challenges,” MIS Q., vol. 40, no. 2, pp.
267–277, Jun. 2016.
G. Walsham, “Are we making a better world with
ICTs? Reflections on a future agenda for the IS field,”
J Inf Technol, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 87–93, Jun. 2012.
L. Fortunati, “Robotization and the domestic sphere,”
New Media & Society, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 2673–2690,
Aug. 2018.
J. Van den Hoven, “Ethics for the Digital Age: Where
Are the Moral Specs?,” in Informatics in the Future,
H. Werthner and F. van Harmelen, Eds. Springer
International Publishing, 2017, pp. 65–76.
B. Hosack, D. Hall, D. Paradice, and J. F. Courtney,
“A look toward the future: decision support systems
research is alive and well,” Journal of the Association
for Information Systems, vol. 13, no. 5, p. 3, 2012.
F. Nelson Ford, “Decision support systems and expert
systems: A comparison,” Information & Management,
vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 21–26, Jan. 1985.
J. J. Sviokla, “An Examination of the Impact of Expert
Systems on the Firm: The Case of XCON,” MIS
Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 127–140, Jun. 1990.
A. Agrawal, J. Gans, and A. Goldfarb, Prediction
Machines: The simple economics of artificial
intelligence. Harvard Business Press, 2018.
H. Simon, Administrative Behavior: a Study of
Decision-Making Processes in Administrative
Organization. Macmillan Inc., 1947.
V. Venkatesh, M. G. Morris, G. B. Davis, and F. D.
Davis, “User Acceptance of Information technology:
Toward a Unified View,” MIS Quarterly, vol. 27, no.
3, pp. 425–478, Sep. 2003.
P. Chwelos, I. Benbasat, and A. S. Dexter, “Research
Report: Empirical Test of an EDI AdoptionModel,”
Information Systems Research, vol. 12, no. 3, p. 304,
2001.
H. Aguinis and A. Glavas, “What We Know and
Don’t Know About Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Review and Research Agenda,” Journal of
Management, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 932–968, 2012.
J. Desmond and A. Crane, “Societal marketing and
morality,” European Journal of Marketing, vol. 36,
no. 5/6, pp. 548–569, Jun. 2002.
K. Mandal and S. Banerjee, “Responsible Marketing
and Its Impact on Business Performance: A
Longitudinal Study,” Journal of Nonprofit & Public
Sector Marketing, pp. 1–24, Oct. 2018.
D.-L. Arjaliès, “A social movement perspective on
finance: How socially responsible investment
mattered,” Journal of business ethics, vol. 92, no. 1,
pp. 57–78, 2010.

[29]
[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]

[38]
[39]
[40]

[41]
[42]

[43]
[44]
[45]

P. R. Murphy and R. F. Poist, “Socially responsible
logistics: an exploratory study,” Transportation
Journal, pp. 23–35, 2002.
A. B. Carroll, “The pyramid of corporate social
responsibility: Toward the moral management of
organizational stakeholders,” Business horizons, vol.
34, no. 4, pp. 39–49, 1991.
European Union, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A
business contribution to Sustainable Development,”
European Commission, Communication from the
Commission, 2002. [Online].
D. E. Rupp, P. M. Wright, S. Aryee, and Y. Luo,
“Special issue on ‘behavioral ethics, organizational
justice, and social responsibility across contexts,’”
Management and organization review, vol. 7, no. 2,
pp. 385–387, 2011.
P. van der Duin, “Toward ‘Responsible Foresight’:
Developing Futures that Enable Matching Future
Technologies with Societal Demands,” World Futures
Review, p. 1946756718803721, Oct. 2018.
M. G. Velasquez and C. Rostankowski, Ethics:
Theory and Practice, 1 edition. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J: Pearson, 1984.
J. Van den Hoven, “Value Sensitive Design and
Responsible Innovation,” in Responsible Innovation,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013, pp. 75–83.
P.-P. Verbeek, Moralizing technology: Understanding
and designing the morality of things. University of
Chicago Press, 2011.
N. Doorn and I. van de Poel, “Editors’ overview:
Moral responsibility in technology and engineering,”
Science and engineering ethics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1–
11, 2012.
C. O’Neil, Weapons of math destruction: how big data
increases inequality and threatens democracy. New
York: Crown Books, 2016.
S. Russell, S. Hauert, R. Altman, and M. Veloso,
“Ethics of artificial intelligence,” Nature, vol. 521, no.
7553, pp. 415–416, 2015.
K. Siau and W. Wang, “Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Ethics: Ethics of AI and Ethical AI,” Journal of
Database Management (JDM), vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 74–
87, 2020.
D. Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981.
F. J. Milliken, “Three Types of Perceived Uncertainty
about the Environment: State, Effect, and Response
Uncertainty,” The Academy of Management Review,
vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 133–143, 1987, doi:
10.2307/257999.
J. Stilgoe, R. Owen, and P. Macnaghten, “Developing
a framework for responsible innovation,” Research
Policy, vol. 42, no. 9, pp. 1568–1580, Nov. 2013.
C. Selin, “On not forgetting futures,” Journal of
Responsible Innovation, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 103–108,
2014.
B. Fernandez-Feijoo, S. Romero, and S. Ruiz, “Effect
of Stakeholders’ Pressure on Transparency of
Sustainability Reports within the GRI Framework,” J
Bus Ethics, vol. 122, no. 1, pp. 53–63, Jun. 2014.

Page 4908

[46]

[47]

[48]
[49]
[50]

[51]
[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]
[56]

[57]

[58]
[59]
[60]

[61]

J. Kang and G. Hustvedt, “Building Trust Between
Consumers and Corporations: The Role of Consumer
Perceptions of Transparency and Social
Responsibility,” J Bus Ethics, vol. 125, no. 2, pp.
253–265, Dec. 2014.
L. Quaak, T. Aalbers, and J. Goedee, “Transparency
of Corporate Social Responsibility in Dutch
Breweries,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 76, no. 3,
pp. 293–308, 2007.
A. Florini, The Right to Know: Transparency for an
Open World. Columbia University Press, 2007.
B. D. Mittelstadt, P. Allo, M. Taddeo, S. Wachter, and
L. Floridi, “The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the
debate,” Big Data & Society, vol. 3, no. 2, Dec. 2016.
J. Burrell, “How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding
opacity in machine learning algorithms,” Big Data &
Society, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 2053951715622512, Jun.
2016.
R. Kitchin, “Thinking critically about and researching
algorithms,” Information, Communication & Society,
vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 14–29, Jan. 2017.
T. Zarsky, “The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions:
An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision
Making,” Science, Technology, & Human Values, vol.
41, no. 1, pp. 118–132, Jan. 2016.
F. Doshi-Velez and B. Kim, “Towards A Rigorous
Science of Interpretable Machine Learning,”
arXiv:1702.08608 [cs, stat], Feb. 2017, Accessed:
Mar. 02, 2019. [Online].
A. Datta, S. Sen, and Y. Zick, “Algorithmic
transparency via quantitative input influence: Theory
and experiments with learning systems,” in 2016
IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP), 2016,
pp. 598–617.
P. Voosen, “How AI detectives are cracking open the
black box of deep learning,” Science, Jul. 05, 2017.
I. G. Cohen, R. Amarasingham, A. Shah, B. Xie, and
B. Lo, “The legal and ethical concerns that arise from
using complex predictive analytics in health care,”
Health affairs, vol. 33, no. 7, pp. 1139–1147, 2014.
B. Lepri, N. Oliver, E. Letouzé, A. Pentland, and P.
Vinck, “Fair, Transparent, and Accountable
Algorithmic Decision-making Processes,” Philos.
Technol., vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 611–627, Dec. 2018.
K. Macnish, “Unblinking eyes: the ethics of
automating surveillance,” Ethics and information
technology, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 151–167, 2012.
L. Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” Daedalus,
vol. 109, no. 1, pp. 121–136, 1980.
J. Davis and L. P. Nathan, “Value sensitive design:
applications, adaptations, and critiques,” Handbook of
ethics, values, and technological design: Sources,
theory, values and application domains, pp. 11–40,
2015.
M. Flanagan, D. C. Howe, and H. Nissenbaum,
“Embodying Values in Technology: Theory and
Practice,” in Information technology and Moral
Philosophy, J. Van den Hiven and J. Weckert, Eds.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.
322–353.

[62]
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]

[67]
[68]

[69]

[70]

[71]

[72]

[73]

[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]

[78]

B. Friedman, “Value Sensitive Design. Encyclopedia
of human-computer interaction,” 2004.
H. Jonas, The imperative of responsibility: In search
of an ethics for the technological age. 1984.
P. Brey, “Disclosive Computer Ethics,” SIGCAS
Comput. Soc., vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 10–16, Dec. 2000.
D. K. Citron and F. Pasquale, “The scored society:
Due process for automated predictions,” Wash. L.
Rev., vol. 89, p. 1, 2014.
O. Tene and J. Polonetsky, “Taming the Golem:
Challenges of ethical algorithmic decision-making,”
North Carolina Journal of law and Technology, vol.
19, no. 1, p. 125, 2017.
O. Tene and J. Polonetsky, “Big data for all: Privacy
and user control in the age of analytics,” Nw. J. Tech.
& Intell. Prop., vol. 11, p. xxvii, 2012.
F. J. Bahamonde-Birke, B. Kickhöfer, D. Heinrichs,
and T. Kuhnimhof, “A Systemic View on
Autonomous Vehicles,” disP - The Planning Review,
vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 12–25, Jul. 2018.
D. E. Leidner, E. Gonzalez, and H. Koch, “An
affordance perspective of enterprise social media and
organizational socialization,” The Journal of Strategic
Information Systems, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 117–138, Jun.
2018.
I. Van de Poel, “Values in Engineering Design,” in
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9, D.
Gabbay, P. Thagard, and J. Woods, Eds. 2009, pp.
973–1006.
C. L. Citroen, “The role of information in strategic
decision-making,” International Journal of
Information Management, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 493–501,
Dec. 2011.
W. Hong, F. K. Y. Chan, J. Y. L. Thong, L. C.
Chasalow, and G. Dhillon, “A Framework and
Guidelines for Context-Specific Theorizing in
Information Systems Research,” Information Systems
Research, vol. 25, no. 1, 2014.
T. M. Jones, “Ethical decision making by individuals
in organizations: An issue-contingent model,”
Academy of management review, vol. 16, no. 2, pp.
366–395, 1991.
J. L. Craft, “A Review of the Empirical Ethical
Decision-Making Literature: 2004-2011,” Journal of
Business Ethics, vol. 117, no. 2, p. 221, Oct. 2013.
D. R. Compeau and C. A. Higgins, “Computer SelfEfficacy: Development of a Measure and Initial Test,”
Mis Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 189–211, Jun. 1995.
H. Barki and J. Hartwick, “Measuring User
Participation, User Involvement, and User Attitude,”
Mis Quart, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 59–82, Mar. 1994.
R. V. Aguilera, D. E. Rupp, C. A. Williams, and J.
Ganapathi, “Putting the S back in corporate social
responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in
organizations,” AMR, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 836–863, Jul.
2007.
A. Mackey, T. B. Mackey, and J. B. Barney,
“Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm
Performance: Investor Preferences and Corporate
Strategies,” The Academy of Management Review,
vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 817–835, 2007.

Page 4909

